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Current Issues on the Political  
Representation of Middle Classes in Chile 
Emmanuelle Barozet and Vicente Espinoza 
Abstract: In this article, we analyze the impact that the evolution of the 
middle classes has had on political representation in Chile. Based on a 
description of the transformations of Chilean social structure in recent 
decades, we review the conceptual frameworks available on the subject, 
from modernization theories and the rise of new masses – particularly 
the one that “emerged” from poverty – to the forming of new critical 
citizens. We state that the heterogeneity of Chilean middle classes has 
challenged the discredited representation system. We observe more effi-
cient representation channels developing for medium-high-income, edu-
cated, and consolidated sectors in contrast to new social policy demands 
from emerging and vulnerable sectors, focusing more on consolidating 
their economic status than on improving representation channels.  
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Introduction 
A grim perspective on political representation characterizes current diag-
noses in Chile and other Latin American countries. Its regular forms 
have failed to counterbalance escalating citizen disaffection with politics, 
distrust of institutions, declining voting turnout, or the sustained resur-
gence of street protest. In this environment, new and consolidated mid-
dle classes seem to play an important role in shaping demands that chal-
lenge traditional forms of representation; this is a far cry from the pat-
tern of the 20th century, when middle-class interests were channeled by 
centrist parties (Johnson 1971; Lomnitz 1998). This situation has reo-
pened the debate on whether the middle classes fuel a modernizing 
democratic project or actually have the potential to destabilize the politi-
cal system (Zeitlin and Petras 1970), especially regarding new groups that 
have emerged from poverty in the last decades. A sustained decline in 
poverty levels across Latin America and the Caribbean in recent decades 
has made apparent new social demands, well beyond the threshold for 
inclusion. However, it still remains to be seen whether a causal order 
exists between these and the challenges to political representation.  
In this article,1 we discuss the extent to which the supposed expan-
sion of middle classes in the last 30 years has impacted the institutional 
system. We examine the Chilean case from three perspectives.2 First, by 
taking up the classical reflection of Germani (1971), we review the impli-
cations of the emergence of middle classes as a new stage of moderniza-
tion (Filgueira et al. 2012). We will particularly observe how these con-
tingents have found room within a restricted political representation 
system in Chile since 1990. We contrast Germani’s conjecture about 
                                                 
1  Acknowledgments: Projects: CONICYT/FONDAP/15130009, FONDECYT 
1160984, USACH-VRIDEI-DICYT 031394VE, Programa de Estímulo a la 
Excelencia Institucional de la Universidad de Chile-Fondo de Fortalecimiento 
de Productividad y Continuidad en Investigación; Facultad de Ciencias Sociales. 
Comments from Cristóbal Rovira, Rossana Castiglioni, Alfredo Joignant, Lucas 
Cifuentes and our anonymous reviewers who have contributed to enrich the 
analysis, as well as comments received during the workshop “Challenges to 
democratic representation in contemporary Chile” organized at Universidad 
Diego Portales on 31 March 2016. The authors would like to acknowledge 
support from the Chilean Millennium Science Initiative (project NS130008). 
We also thank Nikolai Stieglitz for his editing suggestions. 
2  To date, no data has made it possible to measure both social class – as under-
stood in the sociological field – and political action or representation from dif-
ferent political groups in Chile, less so through historical series from 1990 on. 
This is the reason why we use secondary data and reports. 
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“available masses”3 with two more recent approaches. The first is the 
approach of Norris (2011) on the mobilization of critical citizens who 
value democracy, but are unsatisfied with how it works.4 The second 
approach is one of pragmatism of the middle classes in expressing their 
interests (Munijin 2010; Paramio 2010). Leaving aside a thesis that sus-
tains a simple association between middle classes and political represen-
tation, we aim to better understand the relationships between the politi-
cal field and the diverse groups located in the middle section of Chilean 
society. We keep in mind that the heterogeneity of these sectors makes it 
difficult, even for its members, to read into their political and social in-
terests, thus generating ambiguity in their demands. We argue that there 
is not enough ground to sustain a hypothesis based on classical moderni-
zation theory paralleling the situation of middle classes with the available 
masses in the populist configuration. Instead, we argue that we must 
consider two segments. The first is a new, more educated and critical 
generation that exercises pressure toward opening and modernizing the 
representation system. The second is the more vulnerable sectors of 
mesocracy, bordering lower classes, who fearfully regard the opening of 
the political system as a threat to the precarious status they have acquired 
in the last decades. These circumstances reinforce the pragmatist hy-
pothesis regarding vulnerable Chilean low-middle classes, who evaluate 
which proposals best fit its current and changing interests. 
The remainder of this paper is structured in three parts. In the first 
part, we characterize the position of the middle classes in the social 
structure as well as in terms of their participation in politics. We discuss 
the assumption of modernization theory about political representation. 
In the second part, we raise alternative interpretations regarding the 
impact of social structure transformation on the democratic representa-
tion process in Chile today. Here we discuss the argument about emerg-
ing critical citizens, particularly among mobilized groups of civil servants, 
students, and environmentalists. Finally, we examine the political behav-
ior of the so-called “new” middle sectors, made up of low-income man-
ual workers – frequently called “emergent” or “vulnerable” – who are 
more relatively apolitical and concerned with possible displacement. We 
                                                 
3  Although Germani’s concept of available masses referred to the origin of 
Peronism and focused on the newly urbanized working class, some parallels are 
worth pursuing with regard to the Chilean lower middle class, as we will show 
in this article. 
4  The critical citizen concept ranges from people who have critical opinions 
about the political system and do not show formal engagement, to regular par-
ticipation in political alternative action and protest. 
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argue that this last configuration poses the greatest challenges to the 
Chilean representation system and even for the understanding of what 
middle classes are. 
Socioeconomic Characteristics of Chilean  
Middle Classes and their Relationship to  
Political Representation 
The middle classes5 comprise a heterogeneous set of social groups that 
are plainly defined as being neither rich nor poor, or generically as “mid-
dle-income earners” (see Introduction by Castiglioni and Rovira, in this 
issue). The middle of the social pyramid varies greatly in terms of occu-
pation, education level, and income. In terms of their occupations, mid-
dle classes represent approximately 40 percent of the workforce (Torche 
and Wormald 2004; Espinoza, Barozet, and Méndez 2013), encompass-
ing professionals and technicians, non-manual or “white collar” workers, 
as well as less qualified professionals and skilled “blue collar” workers. 
They are mostly salaried workers, from the public and private sector, but 
also comprise small owners and independent workers. Their incomes are 
usually defined by a standard range around the median income (Barozet 
and Espinoza 2009).6 Compared to both ends of the social pyramid, 
middle classes possess higher cultural capital than lower classes, but lack 
the patrimony of higher income sectors. 
Self-assignment to the middle classes applies to over 70 percent of 
the Chilean population, well above any measurement based on indicators 
of social position (Méndez 2008).7 Members of the middle classes usually 
show no common social identities, because an income bracket or a broad 
                                                 
5 Our use is broader than strict “class” taxonomy (Paramio 2010). 
6  According to CASEN 2015, the mean monthly income in Chile is 425 USD per 
capita, while the median income (256 USD per capita) is close to the poverty 
line (215 USD per capita). If purchasing power was the key for characterizing 
middle classes, Chilean middle-income sectors would hardly correspond to a 
family with its own house and access to quality health and education services. 
Yet, following international standards that define middle strata as the group 
that falls within +/-25 percent of median income, the lower bracket falls under 
the poverty line. From a consumption point of view, however, that would in-
clude households that make between 900 USD monthly on the lower end, up 
to 4,500 USD at the higher end, comprising several consumption patterns as 
well as investment and saving capacities (AIM 2015). 
7  Figures published by Torche and Wormald (2004) show up to 83.5 percent of 
Chileans self-identifying as middle class in the Chilean population in 2001. 
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occupational definition does not offer a sound basis to infer about aspi-
rations, opinions, or behavior. Indeed, many people who describe them-
selves as middle class find it difficult to define their social identity: their 
status is higher than their parents, but they do not feel they have reached 
a stable position (Araujo and Martuccelli 2012; Espinoza 2012). Due to 
the intrinsic heterogeneity of this group, middle classes are often de-
scribed as “moving targets” (Chauvel 2000) because their configuration 
changes according to the tool and conceptual definitions applied.  
Regarding the regional context, poverty in Latin America dropped 
from 48.4 percent in 1990 to 28 percent in 2014, but this trend occurred 
earlier and at a faster pace in Chile. The expansion of middle classes in 
Chile is mostly the result of the drastic drop in poverty, from 45 percent 
in 1987 to 11.7 percent in 2015 (CASEN 2016), in a context of low infla-
tion, growth rates close to 5 percent for over two decades, and social 
policies favoring social inclusion. Since 1992, average household income 
doubled in real terms (Barozet and Espinoza forthcoming). Although 
some of these households face the risk of a “poverty relapse”, their in-
crease in developing countries has posed a number of questions about 
their characteristics and affinity for democratic values.  
From an historical point of view, four conglomerates stand out 
among the different groups composing the middle classes in Chile: the 
traditional middle class, the new professionals, the self-employed and 
sectors “emerging” from poverty. First, there is a traditional middle class, 
mainly represented by civil servants, which flourished from the 1920s 
until the early 1970s under a protective industrial policy and active eco-
nomic state involvement. In those days, this group enjoyed favorable 
status, which it could not regain following its pauperization during the 
1970s and 1980s as a result of the implementation of free-market policies 
in Chile (Martínez and Tironi 1985). But in spite of economic transfor-
mations, their unions have gained increasing influence in the definition 
of public policies since the 1990s.  
Starting in the 1980s, new middle segments associated to the private 
sector appeared, thus increasing occupational and income differentiation 
within them (Torche and Wormald 2004; Espinoza, Barozet, and Mén-
dez 2013). This group has expanded first with qualified professionals and 
technicians, as a result of the growth of higher education since the 1990s. 
This increasing group of engineers, physicians, and financial experts 
(among other prominent categories) tends to fill the salaried ranks in 
large firms, although sometimes under precarious contractual conditions 
(OECD 2010; Ruiz and Boccardo 2015). Neither routine white collar 
workers nor professionals in the private sector have developed unions or 
  100 Emmanuelle Barozet and Vicente Espinoza 
 
similar organizations, while professional associations lack strength and 
continuity in their relationship to the public sector or the legislators 
(Espinoza 2001).  
A self-employed middle sector is the third group and the second to 
grow in recent decades due to the progress of Chilean economy. Trade 
growth has created opportunities to establish and expand small and me-
dium-sized firms, especially in the service sector, on a formal and stable 
basis. These self-employed middle sectors belong to traditional industries 
such as transportation, lodging and retail, and also provide security, 
cleaning, and financial services to the new economic sector and to large 
firms (Mac-Clure 2001). Small business represents its interests in several 
trade associations, usually divided by industry, and has gained some in-
fluence in channeling public investment. In 2014, thanks to public de-
bates around tax reform, this group gained support from center and 
right-wing political parties (Espinoza and Palominos 2014).  
Finally, since the early 1990s, the fourth and last middle-sector 
group has been represented by an important contingent that left poverty 
to occupy a hard to define position. This improvement is the result of 
both economic growth and “pro-poor” public policy, particularly 
through the expansion of the labor market and transfers (Espinoza and 
Barozet forthcoming). In the absence of a better concept, they were 
named “emerging”, but also “vulnerable” and even as “the new middle 
class”. Although some members of this group fall back into poverty, the 
increase in average income of these groups is noteworthy compared to 
the 1980s. This low-income non-poor strata use financial credit to ex-
pand their consumption and to put their children through college and 
technical training. Although our viewpoint is that these groups are better 
defined as working than middle classes, debate remains about whether 
the whole group outside of poverty must be considered part of the mid-
dle class; meanwhile, they are targeted by market strategies and many 
consider it a profitable category from a political perspective (Gazmuri 
2002).  
The size of the middle classes has been a controversial subject in 
the debate about social structure in Chile and Latin America (Espinoza 
and Núñez 2014). Broadly defined to include groups outside of poverty, 
the middle classes have increased from 30 percent to 50 percent since 
the mid-1990s (Bárcena and Serra 2010), based on a non-demanding 
definition of families whose daily per capita expenditures (valued at pur-
chasing power parity) are between 2 and 10 USD (Banerjee and Duflo 
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2008).8 Some have observed that 20 percent of this group have very low 
income to be considered part of middle classes, despite internal trans-
formations (Franco, Hopenhayn, and León 2010; Ruiz and Boccardo 
2015; Güemes 2016).9 The following table synthetizes the evolution of 
these social segments using employment data over the last decades.10 
Table 1.  Composition of Middle and Working Class Sectors in Chile 
(1971–2009), as a Percentage of the Labor Force 
Middle sectors 1971 1980 1986 1990 
Employees 18.4 20.3 21 23.6 
Public employees  8.6 7.1 6.8 
Private employees  11.7 13.9 16.9 
Self-employed 7.8 9.2 5.7 6.2 
Total 26.2 29.5 26.7 29.9 
Working class     
Mining working class 1.3 1.3 0.7 1 
Industrial and building working class 25.8 11.1 10 12.1 
Retail and services working class 7.4 12 11.9 12.7 
Total 34.5 24.4 22.6 25.9 
 
Middle sectors 1995 2000 2005 2009 
Employees 26.4 26.5 28.9 29.7 
Public employees 6.6 7.3 6.9 7.2 
Private employees 19.7 19.3 22 22.6 
Self-employed 8.1 8 7.9 7.4 
Total 34.5 34.5 36.7 37.1 
Working class     
Mining working class 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.5 
Industrial and building working class 13.2 10.4 10.9 10.1 
Retail and services working class 13.1 14.6 14.7 15.9 
Total 27.1 25.5 26.1 26.5 
Source:  Ruiz and Boccardo (2015), INE data: 117. 
Regarding the relationship between middle classes and political represen-
tation, we will use a broad definition of representation, as a set of links 
between citizens, social movements and political institutions, to better 
                                                 
8  Other measurements place the middle classes between the 20th and 80th percen-
tiles of consumption distribution (Birdsall, Graham, and Pettinato 2000). These 
measurements are too broad to characterize these groups in terms of their po-
litical orientations or demands. 
9  Using OECD measurement of +/-50 percent from the median income, the 
middle classes would also remain at 33 percent during recent decades. 
10  Chilean historical statistics are quite limited for building detailed, theory-related 
classifications, specifically for the construction of class variables, based on labor 
relationships. 
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capture the diversity of forms of expression of the middle classes. Politi-
cal representation comprises the relationship between citizens and politi-
cal parties, as well as autonomous civil organizations and social move-
ments that take responsibility for speaking for the population’s interests. 
Although there is an important representation crisis in several countries 
in the region (Mainwaring, Bejarano, and Pizarro 2005), Chile is not 
currently on the verge of rupture or collapse of the partisan system; 
therefore, we will concentrate on the challenges faced by the country in 
terms of representation of the middle classes.  
Historically, middle-class politics has been associated with a ternary 
conception of society vis-à-vis lower classes and accommodated sectors. 
Moore (1966) singled out the close relationship between the bourgeoisie 
and democratization processes associated with the industrial revolution. 
The “bourgeois impetus” in northern countries established the idea of a 
virtuous association between middle classes and economic and political 
modernization. During the 20th century, as new middle segments devel-
op under the wing of the state, this conception tended to highlight the 
alleged political stability of the middle classes. Roughly speaking, middle 
sectors strived for a third, moderate vision between socialism or collec-
tivism of the poorest sectors on one side and the defense of capitalism 
of the wealthiest sectors on the other (Boltanski 1982). After the Second 
World War, Lipset and Smelser (1966) brought back the debate pointing 
to the consequences for political modernization of the rising income of 
the population; Przeworski and Limongi (1997) refined this relationship 
for Latin America, stressing the absence of a linear relationship between 
the two phenomena.  
During the 20th century, however, the theory of middle-class prag-
matism gained strength (Grynspan and Paramio 2012). Uncertainty in 
their social position, associated with the absence of political references, 
offered grounds for this interpretation. Public policies, political discours-
es, and institutions face great difficulties in identifying their aspirations 
and demands. Political parties, syndicates, or trade associations do no 
better in terms of shaping their identities, which are permanently threat-
ened by job turnover. These elements configure an inherent contradic-
tion in the middle classes between emancipating and elitist dimensions, 
expressed in their interest in differentiating themselves from the lower 
classes in terms of symbolic status (Gouldner 1979). No direct relation-
ship emerges, then, between middle classes and democratic stability be-
cause they could take different courses regarding politics and representa-
tion systems depending on the country’s economic situation and per-
spectives of individual progress. Indeed, during the 20th century, middle 
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classes in Latin America have supported authoritarian projects when they 
felt their position threatened (Tedesco and Barton 2004). Similarly, when 
the improvement of the living standards of lower classes does not hinder 
their own improvement, or when transformation favors their position 
with regard to the elite, middle classes may support democratizing pro-
jects. Otherwise, they pragmatically support proposals that they feel will 
guarantee economic stability (Johnson 1958), as happened at the end of 
the Unidad Popular in Chile (Candina 2013).  
More recently, and largely ignoring these historical trends, interna-
tional institutions have generally taken a positive view of middle sector, 
even considering it “the backbone of both the market economy and of 
democracy in most advanced societies” (Birdsall, Graham, and Pettinato 
2000: 1; OECD 2010). Other authors have been more skeptical towards 
the association between democratic values and middle sectors (López-
Calva, Rigolini, and Torche 2011; Fierro 2015). A detailed assessment of 
the Chilean situation might offer some insights into these varied ap-
proaches. 
The Impact of Critical Middle Classes on  
Democratic Representation in Contemporary 
Chile 
Beyond being “neither rich nor poor,” middle classes today share the 
characteristic discomfort of intermediate categories (Peugny 2009). This 
theory, which was formulated to describe Chilean society at the end of 
the 1990s (UNDP 1998), highlights the precariousness of post-dictator-
ship social protection systems, the “privatization” of public life, which 
adds to the slowdown of upward occupational mobility during the 2000s 
(Espinoza and Núñez 2014). Declining prices for raw materials across 
the continent and the halving of the price of copper in Chile since 2014, 
have also shaped a new scenario, particularly regarding the government’s 
social investment capacity, which is sure to mold the expectations of 
expansion or consolidation of middle classes. A segment of “dissatisfied 
democrats” has risen up against this background of discomfort, giving 
political expression to the growing distance between citizens and the 
representation system during the last few decades (Dahlberg, Linde, and 
Holmberg 2015).  
Voting offers a first opening for analysis of the association between 
middle classes and political representation. Measurements from the 
1990s show no direct relationship between socioeconomic level and 
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political preferences because, apart from the simultaneous operation of 
religious and class cleavages, an authoritarian/democratic cleavage, in-
herited from the plebiscite of 1988, has had a persistent effect (Valenzue-
la and Scully 1997; Tironi, Agüero, and Valenzuela 2001). To complicate 
things more, rampant and unleashed political disaffection grew in large 
sections of the population (Baño 1995). A drastic decline in electoral 
participation has reflected this, especially since 2012 when voluntary 
voting came into effect (Contreras, Joignant, and Morales 2015), with 
turnout plummeting to 35 percent in 2016 municipal elections. This 
situation is not only part of the disaffection of citizens, but also of their 
critical opinion about the political class.11 
The influence of middle classes on electoral outcomes was first hy-
pothesized for the presidential elections of 2009–2010. Middle class 
“aspirational” groups would have withdrawn their support from the 
Concertación, the coalition of center left parties, and shifted it to the right, 
led by Sebastián Piñera (Barrueto and Navia 2015; Aninat and Elacqua 
2010).12 Subsequent elections have confirmed increasing volatility and 
dealignment of these groups from traditional axes, as well as the re-
composition of the middle class vote for the right (Castillo 2014; Barg-
sted and Somma 2016). These challenges have occurred in conjunction 
with an expanding wave of social protests since the mid-2000s,13 which 
have channeled middle-class demands about upward mobility and social 
justice. For approximately two decades, successful policies of social in-
                                                 
11  The percentage of people participating in elections in Chile, in relation to the 
total voting age population, decreased sustainably from 86 percent in 1989 to 
44 percent in 2013 (UNDP 2015), while the percentage of people disinterested 
in politics has grown from 56 percent in 1989 to 76 percent in 2016, peaking at 
87 percent in 1998 (Mori 2016a). Confidence in political institutions is almost 
non-existent – 7 percent for both houses of Congress and 6 percent for politi-
cal parties – while the highest score is for the police force, with 51 percent 
(Mori 2016b). 
12  Using the Centro de Estudios Públicos’ survey, Barrueto and Navia showed 
that support for the right wing regarding the C2 and C3 sectors (as measured 
by marketing and which represent lower-middle and middle-middle class) in-
creased from 18.5 percent to 42 percent between the 1993 and 2009 presiden-
tial elections, respectively. Research on middle sectors faces the challenge of 
limited measurement tools, particularly for tracing class or socioeconomic level 
of voters through their income or education (Bargsted and Somma 2016; Bar-
rueto and Navia 2015; Bucarey, Engel, and Jorquera 2013). 
13  Somma and Medel (2017) show a strong increase of social protest in Chile 
between 2000 and 2012, through measurement of the number of events (from 
around 150 a year to more than 400) and of people participating in contentious 
action (from around 900 to more than 2,000 over the same period). 
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clusion – namely access to consumption of durable goods and higher 
education – have kept social demands at bay. However, since 2006, mas-
sive street demonstrations have proven quite efficacious for setting the 
priorities in the political agenda of political parties, without being clearly 
articulated. These movements have been able to influence the represen-
tation system, directing the political energy towards a transformation of 
the public agenda. The linkages between discomfort and social protest in 
Chile converge with interpretations by Norris (2011) regarding the influ-
ence of critical citizens and their engagement in contentious politics. 
However, although the middle classes in Chile participate in protests, 
they use various forms of representation that are worth examining in 
terms of demand and vectors of the representation system itself.  
For example, several traditional middle class unions, particularly 
those of teachers, health workers, and public officers, have managed not 
only to increase their demands, but also have met some of them. Exam-
ples of these classical “middle-middle class” (clase media-media) demands 
are the bargaining power of the National Association of Public Employ-
ees (ANEF, after its name in Spanish, Agrupación Nacional de Emplea-
dos Fiscales), the Teacher’s Union, and the National Federation of 
Health Workers. These unions have improved their members’ life condi-
tions, particularly in terms of salaries,14 bonuses, training and retirement 
conditions, especially recently, in the frame of the educational reform 
designed by the second Bachelet government (2014–2018). The medical 
and teaching guilds have been particularly strong in terms of corporate 
negotiation (Espinoza 2001). Interestingly, the number of strikes has 
grown substantively in the public sector since 1990, much more than in 
the private sector, especially since 2007 (OHL 2016). The bargaining 
power of workers in CODELCO – the state copper company – is also 
high, obtaining significant benefits after periods of strike while the price 
                                                 
14  Data are very limited and unavailable by sub- sector. Series are available only 
from 2001 to 2014 through the Encuesta Suplementaria de Ingresos (ESI). Also, in 
2010 there was a change in methodology, which makes it unadvisable to com-
pare the entire period. Comparing nominal income from 2001 to 2009, the sala-
ries of civil servants and private sector workers increased by 1.55 times and 
1.44 times, respectively. From 2010–2014, the difference in growth was re-
duced for these groups (1.33 and 1.34 percent, respectively). In 2010, the mean 
income in the public sector was 44 percent higher than that in the private sec-
tor (INE 2016). Using national employment surveys, Cerda showed that there 
is a 32 percent gap between public and private sector’s remuneration, in favor 
of the public sector (Cerda 2016). 
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of copper was ballooning on international markets.15 However, they 
coexist with the demands of outsourced staff in the same sector, who 
earn less and have less stability.  
Regarding contentious politics and critical actions, a long protest by 
high-school students in 2006 introduced a totally new angle in the rather 
interest-dominated demands for redistribution of public resources. High 
school students were demanding improved quality of education through 
a sustained strategy of street protests and school occupation. Although 
their demands were initially ignored and sidetracked by formal represen-
tation systems, in the medium term, they had a strong effect on 2011 
student movement (Navia 2012; Espinoza 2012). Indeed, we can point 
out the importance of the student movement and its impact on the rep-
resentation systems, according to a cycle that has been documented since 
the 1960s, in which the highest level of education attained by a part of 
the population expresses aspirations in terms of structural changes by 
increasing the cognitive and civil competencies of individuals (Lipset 
1967; Norris 2011). The spark was the high school movement in 2006; 
however, government co-option of high school students in the following 
year showed that even if the promise of change could defuse the conflict 
in the short run, it did not cancel its latency because of the inability of 
political leaders to keep to their commitments about improving the 
quality of education. Since 2011, the powerful resurgence of protest in 
universities, along with widespread support of the Chilean population 
(close to 80 percent) is one of the most striking phenomena in Chilean 
politics, reflecting in particular the interests of families who cannot af-
ford to pay their children’s student loans or who find it difficult for the 
first generation of professionals to enter the labor market (Bellei and 
Cabalín 2013).  
Access to higher education was a key component for the cultural 
distinction of the middle class, the first step to a sound and prestigious 
social standing. Students showed that higher education was not fulfilling 
the promises of upward social mobility – a claim supported by almost 
the entire population – and criticized the assumptions upon which the 
model of development had been established. Indeed, this movement, 
due to the relevance it acquired and the challenge it posed to the repre-
sentation system, seems to embody a new social and political narrative 
focused on structural inequality, replacing the exhausted one on over-
coming poverty (Espinoza 2012). While claims against inequality have 
                                                 
15  The comparatively high income of mining workers has enabled them to express 
the consumption patterns of middle and even high segments. 
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become the main slogan of the demonstrations, a double movement of 
politicizing inequalities is in operation (Guell 2013; see article by Roberts 
in this issue),16 keeping part of the demands outside the scope of co-
option by the political class and simultaneously calling for state interven-
tion.  
Mobilizations around students demands are in line with critical citi-
zen theory, due to the permanent pressure exercised by the students on 
the political system, with a broad reformative discourse of a new “fear-
less” generation that seeks to effect the full promise of reform by politi-
cal elites and radically rebalance society and its institutions (Cummings 
2015). In this regard, the system of rotating spokespersons, especially by 
secondary students, has sought to break the verticality of previous forms 
of organization and prevent co-optation by political parties (Donoso and 
von Bülow 2017). However, the representation capacity of the Chilean 
political system shows its greatest power in the parliamentarian elections 
of 2013, by integrating the main student figures, initially outsiders. These 
are the new members of Congress, Camila Vallejo, Giorgio Jackson, 
Karol Cariola and Gabriel Boric,17 and ministerial collaborators such as 
Camilo Ballesteros and Miguel Crispi. This carries a high cost for these 
figures, who were denounced as traitors by later generations of student 
leaders, causing greater tension with the political system and its channels 
of representation. Outside the student movement, but otherwise similar, 
Iván Fuentes, Aysén’s fishermen union leader and spokesperson during 
the regional upheaval in 2012, entered Congress in 2014. 
To make the analysis even more complex, we cannot forget that 
some of the student demands also express the middle classes in their 
individual aspirational dimension (Grynspan and Paramio 2012). The 
sharp decline of mobilization after the decision of Sebastián Piñera’s 
government (2010–2014) to lower interest in Chile’s state-guaranteed 
student loan program to 2 percent partially reflects an individualized 
demand from families investing in education. Only a small part of the set 
of student leaders and spokespersons have raised broader discourse on 
                                                 
16  Using data from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), Espinoza and 
Guzmán (2013) showed that the proportion of people who believe it is fair to 
have access to health and education depending on one’s income, dropped to 
half in the C2 and C3 sectors between 2000 and 2009. 
17  Camila Vallejo took office as the president of the Education Committee of the 
Lower House of Congress and Giorgio Jackson is one of the most highly eval-
uated politicians, according to the CEP survey of December, 2015. More re-
cently, in the 2016 municipal elections, Jorge Sharp, a 31-year-old former stu-
dent leader, defeated traditional parties in Valparaiso, one of the largest cities of 
the country. 
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social transformation, a discussion that also includes issues like the na-
tionalization of copper and the full provision of social services on a pub-
lic sector basis. Despite its strength, the movement has not managed to 
unite middle classes around their demands (Castillo and Maldonado 
2015). It has been even less successful with lower income groups, whose 
members have virtually no chance of attending college. Another compli-
cating factor is the slowdown of the economy since 2014, which has 
restricted the number of beneficiaries of free education from the prom-
ised 100 percent to college students having a household income below 
the national median. In short, the student movement has exercised 
strong pressure in terms of inclusion, mainly for the middle classes, but 
has also maintained a more radical discourse despite difficulties generat-
ing consensus around profound changes to the representation system. 
In addition to mobilized students, environmentalists and urban pat-
rimony defense movements were largely successful in modifying the 
public agenda in the last decades, articulating the voice of the dissatisfied 
middle-class demands (Silva 2011; Schaeffer 2017). Away from media 
attention, they insert interesting elements into the relationship between 
middle classes and the Chilean representation system. This set of actors 
is considered a “new” social movement in Chile, due to its post-
materialist characteristics (Inglehart 1997).18 However, it was not until 
2000 that its class component was taken into consideration and it is only 
recently that its impact on the representation system has been studied – 
although not systematically – because renewed research on civil society 
since the 1990s has indirectly tended to minimize the conflictive or 
classist dimensions of these movements (Maheu 1995). These are often 
reactive groups such as the case of Ciudad Viva (Alive City), opposing 
the current public policy model, particularly in the area of infrastructure 
and urban development, which does not include local communities at 
the moment of their conception (Silva 2011). These movements in de-
fense of the environment or urban patrimony usually mobilize left-wing 
upper-middle-class professionals (Canteros 2011; Biskupovic 2015). 
Their collective dynamics draw less media attention and work more at 
the level of local institutions.  
The success of the Patagonia without the Dams movement, in addi-
tion to its media strategy, is also explained by the proximity of its mem-
                                                 
18  Although many monographs on the most diverse environmental movements 
are available, there is no systematization yet of this field in Chile. Somma and 
Medel (2017) showed that the number of environmentalist protests grew from 
close to zero to 50 each year from 2000 to 2012, while the number of people 
participating also grew from zero to 200 per event. 
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bers to the political system. The campaign “Vote without Dams” stands 
out: during the presidential campaign in 2013, seven of the nine presi-
dential candidates sided with the movement against HidroAysén 
(Schaeffer 2017). This case is a clear exponent of critical citizens, but it 
also embodies all the ambiguity of the NIMBY (not in my back yard) 
actions. They display great ability for mobilization before public institu-
tions to achieve goals in terms of housing, tourism, and aesthetics, and 
also those of class. Even the education level of these types of move-
ments enables them to become “experts” and pressure public and private 
apparatus (Biskupovic 2015).  
Finally, despite emerging critical citizens, the constitution of new 
political referents seems more challenging. The difficulties in forming 
and acting in the political-electoral arena faced by organizations as varied 
as Evopoli (Political Evolution) and Amplitud (Amplitude), independent 
right and center-right representatives like Ciudadanos (Citizens), inde-
pendent left-centrist representatives like Revolución Democrática (Demo-
cratic Revolution, hereafter RD), and the student caucus reveal ambiguity 
in the relationship between independents and the party system because 
they chose to found their own structures to compete with weak results. 
To date, there is only anecdotal evidence on their class composition, so it 
is not possible to make inferences in terms of a possible electorate. Re-
garding RD, which collected the signatures required to register as a polit-
ical party, one could argue that it represents middle-high and educated 
groups, which are attracted to deep system reform based on proposals of 
participatory democracy and universal social policies. However, it is not a 
destabilizing movement for political institutions. If RD runs successfully 
in the 2017–2018 elections, the question arises as to whether it has the 
ability to defy the main political coalitions to reinstall a three thirds con-
figuration. Although comparable to the Spanish case, where the emer-
gence of Podemos captures part of the new groups available, that change 
occurred within a context of severe economic crisis dissimilar to Chile’s 
present situation. Therefore, although at least one new referent is coming 
into being, it will take time to assess the success of the permeability strat-
egies (Hanagan 1998) of several of these new movements on the way to 
creating political parties and conquering the apparatus of government.  
In observing the results of the demands of these different groups 
through street protests, but also through formal channels of representa-
tion, it is noted that many of them are taken up by the political system. 
Thus, they operate as representation mechanisms outside regular voting. 
In the medium term, this does not correct the lack of confidence in insti-
tutions. It does show, however, that beyond generalized skepticism, part 
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of the demands by the middle classes is being dealt with through their 
own ways of representation, including the demands for transformation 
from the inside. However, the situations described above make it possi-
ble to approach Garretón’s thesis that, during the first decade and a half 
of post-transition, there was no space for the constitution of new actors. 
According to this thesis, dictatorship destroyed the previous state–
market–society articulation, but it did not build a new one; in the last 
decade, however, traditional and new actors have exerted pressure to 
define a new relationship with the state apparatus (Garretón 2014).  
The Ambiguity of the Relationship between  
Privatized Vulnerable Sectors and Political  
Representation: From the Populist Temptation 
to the Pragmatist Hypothesis  
Apart from the actors identified above, a set of more spontaneous and 
less structured movements stand out among the supposedly lower mid-
dle classes, which also challenge political representation in Chile. These 
are a series of more sporadic, yet no less important social actors on the 
social horizon: people who cannot afford medical treatments; those 
scammed by pharmacies, supermarkets, and other retail stores; mortgage 
debtors; users of public transportation; and the heavily indebted. All of 
these groups advocate for transparent access to market more than redis-
tributive policies.19 Anchored in strong disaffection regarding political 
parties, they represent interests related to consumption and do not have 
clear channels of expression in the traditional representation systems. A 
suspicion about their proclivity to support populist movements emerges, 
bringing to the present a classical threat to political stability in Latin 
America.20 Regarding the question of what kind of challenges these more 
reactive and more consumption-focused groups will bring to the repre-
                                                 
19  These groups occasionally organize street and internet protests, successfully 
exerting pressure on economic and political institutions, including fines and jail 
for colluders, or changing the law, as happened with the Ley Ricarte Soto, which 
established public financial protection for high-cost diseases in 2015. 
20  Although populism is a slippery concept in social sciences, we can make use of 
Margaret Canovan’s definition, which described it as a form of contentious po-
litical action, or social and political mobilization, with very vague outlines and 
discourses centered on lower classes, mostly promising distributional policies 
and intending to provoke a strong emotional reaction in the audience to which 
they are addressed (Canovan 1981). 
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sentation system, we argue that the heterogeneity of the middle class and 
of the generally apolitical vulnerable sectors prevents a populist scenario, 
at least not while a strong deterioration of the economy is evident. As a 
Christian Democrat congressman interviewed in 2006 put it, these “bar-
barians”,21 who show no interest in politics or state action, could be 
open to risky political projects. However, the constitution of populist 
referents faces difficulties: political proposals of this kind were restricted 
to presidential candidates since the return to democracy, such as Francis-
co Javier Errázuriz’s in 1989 or Enrique Parisi’s in 2013, when he attract-
ed 15 percent of the votes.22 Marco Enríquez-Ominami (MEO), in trying 
to capitalize on citizen discontent, obtained 20 percent of the vote in 
2009, but was not able to achieve much leverage due to finance-related 
questions surrounding his campaign during the political-financial scandal 
that has swept the country since 2015. Some even consider it difficult to 
argue a populist dimension in MEO’s political program (Bunker and 
Navia 2013). Furthermore, the middle-upper class is more resistant to 
populism, which limits the possibility of developing this type of proposal 
(Filgueira et al. 2012). 
Discarding the emergence of new destabilizing referents in the short 
term, middle-class consumer demands can be seen from different angles, 
but especially as neoliberal demands that do not alter the system, alt-
hough they may seem to challenge representation channels. These are 
the middle-low sectors that depend heavily on their debt capacity to stay 
afloat and will sink in the event of an economic shock. These types of 
actors emerged in 2008 after the unveiling of collusion in the poultry 
industry and each new scandal has reactivated them. The fact that much 
of the process occurs in social networks also interferes; this is because 
although these actors have certain determining power in the political 
agenda, it is limited to those who have Internet access.23 Within this set, 
but more commonly in the medium-high segments, there are groups that 
are affiliated with Isapres (private health insurers) who have successfully 
judicialized their demands, taking the health plans they consider abusive 
                                                 
21  He used this colorful expression as a synonym for a lack of civic mindedness. 
22  The creation of political referents appealing to the middle class, particularly in 
regions outside the capital, has not borne fruit during the post-dictatorship pe-
riod, as seen in the candidacy of Arturo Frei Bolívar in 1999, with 0.38 percent 
of the votes, or that of Ricardo Israel in 2013, which gained 0.57 percent of the 
votes during the first round. 
23  According to Somma (2015), 2012 LAPOP data shows that Chile is the country 
with the highest rate of Internet use in Latin America, with 55 percent of the 
population using it at least a few times a month, but only 16 percent of re-
spondents shared any political information online.  
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to court. There is much less systematic information about these groups 
of sporadic or organized consumers; however, although they lack a 
strong voice and the power to pressurize the political system, they also 
carry deep feelings of discomfort and social criticism toward the repre-
sentation system, because of the unmet promises by capitalist society. 
The demands for rights carried by these movements do not have the 
state as an interlocutor, but the companies themselves, which does not 
result in strengthening the interface with the public sphere (Barozet 
2016).  
Another great challenge for representation in Chile comes from the 
parents who oppose Michelle Bachelet’s primary and secondary educa-
tional reform, whose greatest fear is losing the socioeconomic status they 
have acquired.24 It is interesting to note the divorce between students – 
who demand a more regulated and inclusive system that is not-for-profit, 
cheaper, of better quality and includes proposals for free access – and 
parents of younger children, eager to differentiate themselves from low-
er-income sectors through educational segregation (Canales, Bellei and 
Orellana forthcoming). The Confederation of Parents and Guardians 
from Subsidized Private Schools (CONFEPA, in Spanish: Confeder-
ación de Padres y Apoderados de Colegios Particulares Subvencionados) 
emerged in the spring of 2014, to oppose the government’s reform of 
the primary and secondary systems. In particular, the announcements of 
the end of selective admissions and the obligation to attend nearby 
schools have set off a group of people who see these measures as a 
threat to their social status. They would rather continue to pay for an 
education – though no better than public education – where they may 
select their peers and therefore establish exclusionary mechanisms (Con-
treras 2015). Families who decide to put their children in voucher 
schools represent a large spectrum of socioeconomic levels (Mizala and 
Torche 2012),25 particularly in the middle classes; some perceive the risk 
of losing the opportunity to choose their children’s school as a real threat 
and resent it (Stillerman 2010); this resembles the “status panic” de-
                                                 
24  Although their claim also focuses on education, we give them a different treat-
ment from students, because they oppose the reform proposed by Bachelet’s 
government and the restrictions imposed on private education. This actor is al-
so a more sporadic, occasionally using street demonstration and mostly radio 
and internet campaigns. 
25  According to Agencia de la Calidad de la Educación (2012), using a five-degree 
socioeconomic level index, 1 percent of voucher schools belong to the highest 
socio-economic level, 19 percent to the middle-high level, 36 percent to the 
middle level, 30 percent to the lower-middle level, and 15 percent to the lower 
level.  
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scribed decades ago by Germani (1971). The strong stereotypes of poor 
and lower classes within this “semi privatized class” (Castillo 2014) has 
been a surprise element for the broad set of social actors who have taken 
to the streets in Chile in recent years. It is important to recall that the 
fear of losing social status (Maurin 2009) has been one of the elements 
that stand out in studies on the middle strata in Europe and the USA in 
recent years. It is an element that operates as a strong unitary vector and 
acts collectively against policies perceived as downward social leveling. 
This reinforces the idea that part of the middle classes may return to 
polarizing patterns if the government’s political project affects their in-
terests (Paramio 2010).  
To this description of the demands of mesocratic groups that are 
more precarious, with much lower salaries, we add a reflection on the 
rest of the lower groups that is not part of any collective action or has 
not actively participated in the expression of certain social demands in 
recent years. Groups that “emerge” from poverty economically precari-
ous and less educated have entered secondary education, work as un-
skilled workers, and are better off than their parents. Sociologically, they 
belong to the working classes, but they are often classified by economists 
and the media as the lower middle class. In Chile and other societies, 
these groups, which describe themselves as middle class as a symbolic 
way of differentiating themselves from the poor, are still the “losers” of 
the system (Paramio 2012), based on a fundamental social division be-
tween them, the manual laborers, and the rest of society. They have no 
savings capacity, health plans beyond basic coverage, or retirement plans; 
they consequently show concern about their access to health, public 
security, and employment (Barrueto and Navia 2015). Although sociolo-
gy of collective action has been a field of many heuristic developments in 
recent years, it also tends to obscure the fact that an important part of 
Chilean society – particularly in middle-low and uneducated groups – is 
not mobilized to defend its own interests against the state or the market 
or to redefine the rules of the political game or the distribution of 
growth, which represents the greatest challenge for representation for 
current democratic systems.  
In the view of Norris (2011), these sectors do not have strong ex-
pectations of the state, because they consider public assistance a stigma, 
as it occurs with the poor, and that the possibility of improvement re-
sides primarily in oneself. An important contingent states that there are 
more opportunities today, especially through education, than for older 
generations that lived in worse poverty. Their stories are individual, 
without references either to other actors or to the state. They believe that 
  114 Emmanuelle Barozet and Vicente Espinoza 
 
people who fare poorly do so due to their own faults, according to the 
hyper-responsibility principle pointed out by Araujo and Martuccelli 
(2012). In middle-lower and lower classes, particularly self-employed 
workers, the legitimacy of salary differences is accepted as a reflection of 
individuals’ degree of preparation and contribution to society. Criticism 
is directed toward the social barriers to these principles and discrimina-
tion people face in the labor market. Although the difference between 
the richest and the poorest is considered too large (COES 2014), this 
judgment does not trigger collective action. The affirmation that anyone 
can rise if they put their heart into it, despite great injustices, especially 
through access to studies and to effort in work, limits the feeling of frus-
tration (Mac-Clure and Barozet 2016). These groups are willing to sacri-
fice their own wellbeing in order to give their children the best opportu-
nities, through access to education; therefore, the promise of wellbeing 
may wait until the next generation. Additionally, these individuals do not 
believe in politics: they are the ones who most strongly reject the political 
class, which is aggravated by the political-financial scandals of 2015 
(UNDP 2016). There is no sound evidence that these groups are inclined 
to clientelism like the lower classes (see articles by Morgan and Melen-
dez, and Roberts in this issue). The behavior of these sectors, which is 
less known, less predictable, and clearly removed from the political appa-
ratus, does raise important challenges to the representation system, in 
terms of a possible crisis of incorporation (Filgueira et al. 2012) in the 
event of a slowdown in the economy.  
Conclusion 
The participation of middle classes in recent mobilizations across Latin 
America (Paramio 2010) has generated “anxiety” regarding their destabi-
lizing potential (Norris 2011), particularly their ability to consolidate or 
pauperize in a short time in response to the slowdown of the regional 
economy. However, in order to analyze the relationship between middle 
classes and political representation, it is necessary to go beyond unilateral 
thesis and to differentiate segments among middle classes, as well as 
representation channels, because they contain diverse realities and show 
strong ambivalence (Gayo 2013). The political integration of middle 
sectors is effected firstly by solid economic integration and the percep-
tion that the economy and the government in office are doing well 
(Dahlberg, Linde, and Holmbert 2015). However, this process might be 
threatened in the medium term due to their vulnerability. The “uncer-
tainty of the growth model” (Paramio 2012: 289) is a key to understand-
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ing the position of middle classes. Today, significant parts of the middle 
sectors consider themselves “capitalists” and wish to continue doing so. 
However, because of the current train of reforms and the emergence of 
new social and political referents, Chile may return to a political system 
based on three thirds, ending the possibility of elite agreements, as has 
been the case in recent decades. This is one of the greatest fears of the 
elite, because it could open and shuffle representation mechanisms. To-
day, there is still strong pressure on the representation system, not only 
to meet corporate demands, but also to improve the democratic deficit. 
The question is whether the ongoing reforms will manage to alleviate 
them and open the representation system without a major crisis. 
The shift of the debate in Chile in the last 20 years, from minimum 
inclusion to questions on the quality of life and fair distribution of posi-
tions in society, has been particularly relevant for the varied middle clas-
ses, although the answers, in terms of political representation, have been 
very different according to the segments they are made up of. On the 
one hand, many of the traditional middle-class and upper- or educated-
class demands are taken up by the system, particularly through union 
negotiation or pressure on the traditional system, and can lead to the 
creation of new political referents, according to Norris’ hypothesis about 
the emergence of critical citizens. On the other hand, the situation that is 
of most concern is that of the emerging middle-lower classes, which 
border low-income manual workers, who do not have their own repre-
sentation channels and who are not represented in the new electoral 
system. Thus, in the event of an economic crisis, as a group, they may be 
available for projects defying the current representation system. There-
fore, the challenge is twofold: to favor their integration into the political 
system, and also to deploy more universal public policies aimed at social 
protection, in order to make space at the table for more precarious 
groups of the mesocracy, which now depend more on their ability to 
insert themselves into the labor market than on state actions. They have 
the potential to contribute directly to an eventual representation crisis in 
Chile and to a “winter of democracy” (Hermet 2007) in the event of 
sustained degradation of economic performance, exacerbated by the 
absence of alternatives to the current productive model. 
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Disputas en torno a la representación política de las clases medias 
en el Chile actual 
Resumen: En este artículo, analizamos el impacto de la evolución de las 
clases medias en la representación política en Chile. En base a la descrip-
ción de la estructura social chilena en las décadas recientes, examinamos 
los distintos marcos teóricos disponibles, desde las teorías de la moder-
nización y el auge de las nuevas masas – particularmente de los grupos 
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sociales que emergen de la pobreza – hasta la aparición de nuevos ciuda-
danos críticos. Argumentamos que la heterogeneidad de las clases medias 
chilenas ha desafiado el sistema de representación, actualmente despres-
tigiado. Observamos canales de representación más eficientes en el caso 
de las clases medias de ingresos más altos, más educadas y más consoli-
dadas, en contraste con demandas por nuevas políticas sociales de parte 
de los sectores emergentes y vulnerables, que se enfocan más en la con-
solidación de sus status que en la mejora de los canales de representa-
ción. 
Palabras clave: Chile, clases medias, representación política, vulnerabili-
dad 
 
